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INTRODUCTION 
The issue of global warming is everywhere.  Not only does the topic 
fill the pages and screens of all media, e.g., newspapers, reviews,1 or 
films,2 it also regularly and increasingly occupies private companies,3 
economists and businessmen,4 lawyers,5 scientists,6 and politicians7 alike.  
It even interests the museums.8  Global warming, which is mainly caused 
by the increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere,
9 or most of 
global warming at least, is, it seems, the result of human activity.  But 
human activity is far from new.  What is new is a certain type of human 
activity—that linked to industrial development and therefore progress.  
The question then arises: could intellectual property rights (IPRs) be 
the cause of global warming?  After all, the industrial revolution has 
brought with it IPRs, among the most relevant of which is the right to 
protect inventions.  And the primary aim of patent law is to give an 
incentive to inventors to invent new products, processes and machines. 
* PhD (London), Lecturer, School of Law, University of Nottingham.  A previous version of 
this Article was presented at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 2007 in Chicago.  
The author would like to thank the participants of the conference for their comments.  Of 
course, the author remains entirely responsible for any errors.  She can be reached at 
estelle.derclaye@nottingham.ac.uk and ederclaye@hotmail.com 
1. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Global Warming is a Hoax*, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, 
cover story; Sharon Begley, The Truth About Denial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2007, at 20; THE 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, June 19, 2007, at 1 (discussing a peer-reviewed article, 
“Climate change and trace gases,” authored by six leading scientists who conclude that the 
earth is in imminent danger because of global warming); Steve Conner, The Earth Today 
Stands in Imminent Peril, THE INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, June 19, 2007, available at 
http://environment.independent.co.uk/climate_change/article2675747.ece (last visited Jan. 11, 
2008); Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, BBC NEWS, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4267245.stm (last visited Jan. 11, 2007); The Greening of 
America, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 9. 
2. See, e.g., AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Lawrence Bender Productions, Participant 
Productions 2006), available for purchase at http://www.an-inconvenient-truth.com. 
3. To cite just a few completely random company advertisements I encountered:  
Vattenfall, “Energy for activists, empty words just add [CO2],” THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 
2007, at 2; Eurostar “Environmentally Co2nscious,” THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2007, at 56. 
4. See, e.g., the carbon trading market, which is allowed by the Kyoto Protocol and 
started in 2008.  See Peter Davies, European Union Environmental Law, An Introduction to 
Key SelectedIissues, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2004, p. 287. 
5. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EC). 
6. For examples, see the references cited in this article. 
7. See, e.g., this year’s G8 summit. 
8. London’s Tate Modern Gallery had an exhibit on CO2 emissions during the summer 
of 2007. 
9. It is also caused by other so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
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Copyright law’s rationale is similar.  Some of the greatest inventions 
of the last two centuries include the car, the train, the plane, the 
refrigerator, and the computer, and with them comes the use of energy, 
generally oil and coal, to make them work.  These are some of the 
causes that contribute the most to the increase in levels of CO2 in the 
planet’s atmosphere.  For instance, a third of CO2 emissions in the 
European Union (EU) are generated by transport.10  The intellectual 
property academic community has so far paid very little attention, if 
any, to this increasingly important issue.11  It is time, however, that the 
national and international intellectual property systems and treaties be 
reassessed in view of this problem that touches every human being, if 
one accepts that human activity is the main cause of global warming as 
the vast majority of the scientific community indicates.12
This Article concentrates on how the existing international 
intellectual property instruments and EU law already provide 
safeguards to limit the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.
13  Some 
reference will also be made to UK law, to take the law of one country, 
when international or EU law is silent or not specific on the question.  
10. Charlotte Streck & David Freestone, The EU and Climate Change, in 
REFLECTIONS ON 30 YEARS OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, A HIGH LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION?, 85, 102 (Richard Macrory ed., Europa Law Publishing 2006). 
11. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with 
Intellectual Property Innovation:  A New Basis for Patent Rewards, July 5, 2005, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=756844; F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 307 (2002) (discussing only generally both the interface between patents and 
the protection of the environment).  CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, A COMMENTARY TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 99-101 
(Oxford University Press 2007) (discussing the TRIPs provisions referring to the protection 
of  the environment); Brad Sherman & Nicola Atkinson, “Intellectual Property and 
Environmental Protection” [1991] EIPR 165; Jeremy Phillips, People in Greenhouses, 
Editorial, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC., 269, 269 (May 2007). 
12. See, e.g., Peter Davies, Trading in Greenhouse Gas Emissions:  The European 
Community’s Endorsement of Emissions Trading, INT’L ENERGY LAW & TAX. R. 105 (2006) 
(citing several sources including the European Environment Agency and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch).  See also Scientific Expert 
Group Report on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, Feb. 2007, 
http://www.unfoundation.org/SEG; THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, June 19, 2007, 
at 1; Begley, supra note 1,.  I therefore make the assumption that humans are responsible for 
the best part of the increase of CO2 emissions and, therefore, follow the opinion of the 
majority of the scientific community. 
13. I will limit the discussion to CO2 although there are many other GHGs.  More 
research would need to be undertaken before the arguments made here could be 
extrapolated to GHGs in general and even more generally to the protection of the 
environment as a whole.  Nevertheless, sometimes reference will be made to the relationship 
between IPRs and the environment more generally when the laws do not specifically refer to 
CO2. 
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Reference will also sometimes be made to U.S. law for comparison 
purposes.  More generally, the solutions developed in this Article may 
not only apply in Europe, but may also inspire other countries, including 
the United States, as they are based on international instruments and 
universal arguments that can apply in any country.  For reasons of 
space, and because they are perhaps the most important rights as far as 
generating CO2 is concerned, this Article focuses only on patents and 
copyrights.  This Article has two parts.  Part I examines how the current 
patent and copyright laws may already help reduce levels of CO2.  
Thereafter, Part II envisages how intellectual property laws could be 
improved to further reduce the levels of CO2 if this is something 
governments and/or the international community decide to do. 
I.  THE CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT 
ON GLOBAL WARMING 
This Part is divided into six Sections.  Before looking at the actual 
provisions of current patent and copyright laws, their underlying 
rationales are examined to enlighten whether they have an impact on 
carbon emissions (Section A).  Section B looks at general provisions of 
the international agreements to determine whether they deal with the 
interface between IPRs and the environment and, more specifically, 
levels of CO2.  From this first general overview, it will be seen that there 
are different rules within intellectual property laws that directly or 
indirectly safeguard the environment and favor the reduction of CO2.  
There are three ways in which intellectual property laws already permit 
the reduction of CO2: the first is through morality and ordre public 
provisions (Section C), the second is through the use of compulsory 
licenses (Section D), and the third is through the exhaustion principle 
(Section E).  Section F concludes this Part. 
A.  Rationales for Intellectual Property Protection 
At first sight, IPRs can be seen as neutral, as their aim is simply to 
give an incentive to invent new technologies or create original works.  
For instance, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the 
Copyright and Patent clause) simply gives Congress the power “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”  This is one of the main justifications for 
having both patent and copyright laws; it is known as the incentive 
theory or utilitarian argument.  Under this justification, if individuals 
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know they may obtain an exclusive right (the reward that allows them to 
exclusively exploit their intellectual property and therefore reap the 
monetary benefits from it) if they produce a new product or an original 
creation, they will be encouraged to create or innovate.  Under this 
justification, general wellbeing or social welfare is achieved, as the world 
is better off with better products (e.g., better medicines, better 
machines) and more cultural diversity.  This argument is based on the 
principle of utility and the writings of late 18th- and 19th-century 
philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.14  
The other main justification for having patents and copyrights is that 
they are natural rights.  It is natural that an inventor or a creator obtains 
an intellectual property right to the fruits of his or her labor.  This was 
first developed by Locke in the 17th century.  Although he thought of 
only physical labor,15 this theory has been extrapolated to include 
intellectual labor.  These are the two main classical justifications for 
both rights.16  One more recent and important justification for IPRs is 
that they are human rights based on the fact that they are property 
rights, albeit intellectual.17  As human rights all have the same rank, they 
must therefore be balanced with each other and cannot be absolute.18
14. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMy (W.J. Ashley  ed., 
London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1909) 1848; THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John 
Bowring ed.) 1843. 
15. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government:  An Essay Concerning the True 
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 267, 
285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1960). 
16. For detailed discussions on these justifications, see, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND 
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 16 (3d ed., West Publishing 2000).  For copyright in particular, 
see, e.g., CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC À L’INFORMATION, 
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 23 (Litec 2004); LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT 
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY 
OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 9-10 (Kluwer Law International 2002); J.A.L. STERLING, 
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 56 (Sweet & Maxwell 1999); ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR 
ET COPYRIGHT:  DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES 144 (Bruylant/LGDJ:  Bruxelles/Paris, 
1993); WILHEM GROSHEIDE, AUTEURSRECHT OP MAAT, Diss 11, 128-45 (Utrecht, Deventer 
Kluwer: Amsterdam, 1986).  Other less developed justifications exist and are therefore not 
discussed here. 
17. See, e.g., Paul L.C. Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in COPYRIGHT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – PRIVACY 1 
(Paul L.C. Torremans ed., Kluwer Law International 2004); GEIGER, supra note 16. 
18. GEIGER, supra note 16, at 167; Christophe Caron, Liberté d’expression et liberté de 
la presse contre droit de propriété intellectuelle, 2 C.C.E. 25 (2002); TORREMANS, supra note 
17, at 17; Thomas Dreier, Contracting Out of Copyright in The Information Society:  The 
Impact on Freedom of Expression, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH:  COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 385, 395 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., Oxford 
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What consequences do these justifications have in the context of this 
article?  Under the natural rights theory, it seems that any inventor or 
creator should have a property right to his or her intellectual labor, 
whatever the consequence it has on global warming.  Nonetheless, one 
could argue that according to an extrapolation of the principles 
advocated by Locke, the inventor or creator should consider the impact 
of his or her invention or work on the environment.  Indeed, for Locke, 
the right to private ownership requires that the owner leaves in the 
commons enough and as good for others and that he or she may not 
remove more out of the commons than she or he can use (the “non-
waste” condition).19  Under the utilitarian justification or incentive 
theory, the idea is to grant exclusive rights to creators and inventors in 
the public interest—in other words, to promote social welfare.  
Therefore, this means that IPRs should not damage the environment 
and, more specifically, increase levels of CO2, as this is arguably not 
generating social welfare.  More specifically, under the U.S. Copyright 
and Patent Clause, which seems to support this incentive theory, the 
idea is that these two IPRs must promote progress.20  What is progress is 
a philosophical question, which would take too long to debate here.  But 
under a certain view, it may include the improvement of human life, 
which should include general well-being.21  Therefore, again, it should 
mean that patents and copyrights should not be given for inventions and 
creations that increase the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere if this leads 
to global warming.  Or at least a balance should be made between the 
benefits of the invention/creation and its carbon impact.22  It should be 
noted that the most recent multi-regime international instrument on 
IPRs (the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
University Press 2005). 
19. LOCKE, supra note 15, ¶ 27, 287-88, ¶ 31, 290. 
20. To date, neither courts nor academics, at least in Europe, have paid much attention 
to the definition of progress.  See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property 
Clause:  Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1771, 1837 (2006) and references cited.  W. Van Caenegem, Intellectual Property 
Law and The Idea of Progress,3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY QUARTERLY 237 (2003).  But see 
MANDEL, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that patent law’s purpose to promote progress is “a 
promising premise for the goal of incentivizing environmental innovation”). 
21. Some views may also include the well-being of any living beings including animals 
and perhaps plants. 
22. As far as the meaning of promoting progress is concerned, some have suggested 
interpreting the Patent and Copyright Clause as follows:  “An intellectual property enactment 
does not ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts’ and is therefore unconstitutional if 
its marginal benefits, in terms of creativity and knowledge, are extremely outweighed by its 
marginal costs in terms of creativity and knowledge.”  Oliar, supra note 20, at 1840. 
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Property Rights (TRIPs)) mentions in Article 7 that the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs should contribute to social and economic welfare, 
thereby also endorsing, albeit not expressly, a reduction in carbon 
emissions if this is conducive to social and economic welfare.23  Article 7 
of TRIPs will be discussed in more detail in the next Section.  Finally, 
there is as yet no human right to a healthy environment,24 but human 
rights to life and privacy, for instance, may come in conflict with IPRs or 
otherwise be said to have the same goal—human well-being—as IPRs 
under the human rights approach.  In conclusion, possibly under the 
naturalist justification and at least under the incentive theory and 
human rights approaches, which can be seen as having the same end 
aim, IPRs’ goal can be said to be congruent with the reduction of CO2. 
B.  General Provisions 
When one asks oneself how intellectual property laws cater to the 
protection of the environment and especially for the reduction of CO2 in 
the atmosphere, the first thing that comes to mind is to look into the 
intellectual property international treaties and conventions.  What do 
these instruments say about the relationship between IPRs and the 
protection of the environment?  First of all, it is mostly patents that are 
concerned with the environment, as they protect inventions that may 
have a negative impact on the environment such as new cars, planes, 
trains, and more generally products, machines, or processes that 
generate CO2.  Copyright works protect creations that are generally 
harmless to the environment (e.g., drawings, sculptures, and films) but 
may sometimes generate CO2.  This section looks at the two multi-
regime treaties on IPRs and examines whether they contain general 
provisions on the interface between IPRs and the environment and, 
more specifically, levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
As the protection of the environment, particularly the problem of 
global warming, is a new issue, it is logical that the old conventions do 
not address this problem specifically.25  However, the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, the main and oldest 
convention dealing with patents, already provided a general provision 
23. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 7, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81, 1997 (1994). 
24. See infra Part II.C. 
25. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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preventing patent owners from blocking progress.26  Article 5A(2)-(4) of 
the Paris Convention provides that countries can impose compulsory 
licenses if there is an abuse of the exclusive right, e.g., failure to work 
the patented invention.  This provision is not specific to the protection 
of the environment but to progress.  In any case, it can be used to force 
a patent holder to work its environmentally-friendly invention. 
As it is more recent, TRIPs directly and indirectly addresses 
environmental concerns.  Several articles of TRIPs are relevant: Articles 
7 and 8, generally, and Article 27.2 regarding patents.  This section 
focuses on Articles 7 and 8, which can apply to all IPRs.  Section C will 
address Article 27.2, as it relates exclusively to patents.  Articles 7 and 8 
may be read as general safeguards that may ensure that IPRs do not 
encourage global warming. 
Article 7, “Objectives,” provides that “[t]he protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”27  On 
the other hand, Article 8.2, “Principles,” provides in sum that measures 
may be needed to prevent intellectual property holders from abusing 
their rights.28
Articles 7 and 8 are important articles that provide interpretation of 
the TRIPs agreement as a whole.29  According to Article 7, IPRs should 
work “in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare” and 
require a balance between rights and obligations of IPR holders.30  
However, the agreement does not give any standard to make this 
balance.31  On the other hand, the first part of Article 7 “means that the 
recognition and enforcement of intellectual property rights are subject 
to higher social values.”32  One of these values of course is the respect of 
26. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last 
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
27. TRIPs, supra note 22, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
28. Id., art. 8.2. 
29. CORREA, supra note 11, at 93. 
30. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 7. 
31. The High Commissioner, Report of the High Commissioner on The Impact of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶ 23, 
delivered to the Comm. On Human Rights, delivered to the Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) 
[hereinafter Report of the High Commissioner].  See also TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 27.2. 
32. CORREA, supra note 11, at 99. 
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human rights.  While international intellectual property instruments 
have not, or have little, recognized the tension between IPRs and 
human rights,33 TRIPs recognizes values underlying human rights in the 
exceptions to the exclusive rights, e.g., the protection of the 
environment.34  But the main question is whether the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) panel and the Appellate Body should consider 
human rights when interpreting TRIPs.  Many have suggested that the 
WTO must respect human rights.35
As to Article 8, some have argued that it is “essentially a policy 
statement that explains the rationale for measures taken under Articles 
30, 31, and 40.”36
In any case, a number of developing countries, the Ministerial 
Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health,37 and 
paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration38 all confirm the importance of 
Articles 7 and 8 in interpreting TRIPs.  These two articles should be 
important in construing the exceptions to exclusive rights, e.g., fair use 
in copyright law and research and access to pharmaceuticals in the 
context of patent rights.39  One might add to this that Articles 7 and 8 
are also crucial in interpreting the exceptions that favor the reduction of 
CO2, mainly Articles 27.2 and 31.  These will be examined in the next 
two Sections.  The respect of human rights will be discussed in Part II, 
Section C. 
C.  Morality and Ordre Public Provisions 
As the combined general provisions of the Paris Convention and 
TRIPs point out, IPRs cannot be abused and must be balanced against 
higher values.  Within intellectual property international instruments, 
some specific provisions already exist to take these values into account.  
These provisions are reflected in European law.  The first two 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 100 (citing Report of the High Commissioner); TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 27.2; 
Report of the High Commissioner, supra note 30, ¶ 22. 
35. CORREA, supra note 11, at 100-01; see Richard Ford, The Morality of Biotech 
Patents:  Differing Legal Obligations in Europe?, 6 E.I.P.R. 315, 317 (1997). 
36. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 121 (2d ed., Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell 2003). 
37. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). 
38. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
39. CORREA, supra note 11, at 103. 
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provisions are the morality and public order, also known as public policy 
or ordre public provisions (these latter three expressions will be used 
interchangeably).  Section C.1 examines the provisions relating to 
patents, and Section C.2 examines those relating to copyright. 
1.  Patents 
It is in Article 27 of TRIPs where provisions for the respect of the 
environment and therefore implicitly the more specific problem of 
global warming can be found.  Paragraph 1 of Article 27 simply obliges 
Members to ensure that patents may be granted in all fields of 
technology.40  On the other hand, Paragraph 2 allows Members to 
prohibit the patentability of inventions in order to protect ordre public 
or morality including to “avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the 
exploitation is prohibited by their law.”41  It has long been accepted that 
no IPRs can be granted for immoral inventions or creations.42  For 
patents, this is reflected in Article 27.2 of TRIPs.  In addition, TRIPs 
goes further as it includes the prejudice to the environment as contrary 
to ordre public or morality.  However, as with compulsory licenses (see 
Section D.1. below), Article 27.2 is not mandatory.  Members are free to 
prohibit immoral inventions or not. 
First, it can be said that part of Article 27.2 does not provide a clear 
standard to assess when there is a serious prejudice to the 
environment.43  It is true that the text requires the prejudice to be 
serious, thereby both narrowing the provision and rendering it clearer.  
But on the other hand, this seriousness standard is still imprecise.  The 
provision also seems narrow because it refers to “avoid[ing]” prejudice 
to the environment, “which would seem to exclude cases in which the 
aim of the refusal would be to mitigate or control such prejudice.”44  
Nevertheless, this is a useful yardstick, as the seriousness may be actual 
or potential since Article 27.2 does not distinguish between the two 
(which is a positive aspect of the Article).45  In any case, this provision 
40. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 27. 
41. Id., art. 27.2. 
42. This is, however, not the case in U.S. patent law anymore.  See Margo A. Bagley, 
Patent First, Ask Questions Later:  Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2003). 
43. See M. Bruce Harper, TRIPs Article 27.2:  An Argument for Caution, 21 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 383-84 (1997). 
44. CORREA, supra note 11, at 290. 
45. Id. 
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has the merit to exist; it is a step in the right direction46 and should 
prompt national legislatures to adopt specific measures to reduce levels 
of CO2 in the atmosphere.  Patent offices of Members that have 
incorporated Article 27.2 into their laws should therefore examine 
whether the invention for which a patent is applied actually or 
potentially seriously damages the environment.  As far as global 
warming is concerned, depending on whether they take a broad or 
restrictive view, patent offices could either not grant patents for any 
invention which emits CO2 or make a cost-benefit analysis in terms of 
the value of the invention for society and the levels of CO2 emitted.
47  
This might be the preferred option, as the standard is a serious prejudice 
against the environment.  Thus, requiring that every invention does not 
emit any CO2 at all might be construing the exception too broadly.  Also, 
arguably, it is only the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere that is causing 
global warming. 
How do patent laws in Europe deal with the issue of the reduction of 
CO2?  Patent law is very similar throughout Europe because most 
European countries are parties to the European Patent Convention 
(EPC), which provides common rules on patentable subject matter 
among other topics.48  Similar to Article 27.2 of TRIPs, Article 53(a) of 
the EPC provides that “European patents shall not be granted in: (a) 
respect of inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality, provided that the exploitation shall 
not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law 
or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.”49  A major 
difference is that the provision is mandatory.  Another difference with 
Article 27.2 of TRIPs is that there is no specific reference to the 
protection of the environment, certainly because at the time it was 
adopted in 1973, this concern had not yet emerged.  In any case, 
inventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public 
can nowadays include serious prejudice to the environment as has been 
46. See also Ford, supra note 35, at 316. 
47. See Oliar, supra note 20, at 1840 (proposing test based on the Copyright and Patent 
Clause); supra INTRODUCTION. 
48. See generally Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/ep/ep001en.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) 
[hereinafter EPC]. 
49. Id., art. 53.  According to the interpretation of this article, it is only the exploitation 
of the patent that must give offense.  See, e.g., MARGARETE SINGER & DIETER STAUDER, 
THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, A Commentary, 87 (3d ed., vol. 1, Sweet & Maxwell 
2003). 
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held by the European Patent Office (EPO) Board of Appeal in Plant 
Genetic Systems, its most recent relevant decision on this topic.50  There 
has been no case so far dealing with an invention that might increase the 
levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.  However, the various branches of the 
EPO have had to deal with cases based on Article 53(a) that dealt with 
genetically modified animals or plants, which could seriously prejudice 
the environment. 
The EPO’s current view is that it will assess whether an invention 
seriously prejudices the environment in the sense that it is for the 
European institutions to decide what morality and public order mean.51  
On the other hand, its view is that exceptions to patentability must be 
narrowly construed.52  Therefore, inventions the exploitation of which is 
likely to seriously prejudice the environment are not patentable under 
Article 53(a) EPC.53  On the other hand, there is no set test to do so.  As 
the EPO Board of Appeals in Plant Genetic Systems states, “a balancing 
exercise is not the only way of assessing patentability, . . . perhaps useful 
in situations in which an actual damage and/or disadvantage (eg (sic) 
suffering of animals . . .) exists.”54  This balancing exercise or utilitarian 
(cost-benefit) approach was adopted by the Board of Appeal in its 
earlier Harvard/Onco Mouse decision.55  In that case, which involved the 
patenting of a genetically modified mouse in order to cure cancer, it 
held that the application of Article 53(a) “would seem to depend mainly 
on a careful weighing up of the suffering of animals and possible risks to 
the environment on the one hand, and the invention’s usefulness to 
mankind on the other.”56  The case went back to the Examining 
Division, which held the invention patentable because finding a cure for 
cancer was desirable and the mouse would help achieve this aim; the 
50. Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, T 356/93, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (TBA) at 
Reasons ¶ 5 [hereinafter Plant Genetic Systems].  See also SINGER & STAUDER, supra note 
49, at 88; LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 438 (2d ed., 
Oxford University Press 2004). 
51. Plant Genetic Systems, T 356/93 at Reasons ¶¶ 4-5.  Previously, the Opposition 
Division held that the EPO was not the place to make ethical decisions.  See Plant Genetic 
Systems, 24 IIC 618 (1993); Howard Florey/Relaxin, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541, 552; BENTLY & 
SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 437. 
52. Plant Genetic Systems, T 356/93 at Reasons ¶ 18. 
53. EPC, supra note 48, art. 53. 
54. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 50, at Reasons ¶ 18.8 
55. See Harvard/Onco-Mouse, [1990] O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.); 
Harvard/Onco-Mouse, T19/90 [1990] E.P.O.R. 501; [1990] O.J. E.P.O. 490 (TBA); [1991] 
E.P.O.R. 525 (Examining Div.).  See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 436-37. 
56. Harvard/Onco-Mouse, T 19/90 [1990] E.P.O.R. at 513; T 0315/03, 6 July 2004, 
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t030315ex1.pdf. 
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harm caused by the invention to the mouse weighed less in the scale.57  
This approach was later followed in a case involving a patent by Upjohn 
for a mouse genetically modified to lose hair.  In contrast with 
Harvard/Onco Mouse, because the harm suffered by the mouse was 
greater than the benefit from the invention, the EPO refused the patent 
application.58  As stated in Plant Genetic Systems, this test has not been 
discarded, but other tests could be used.  As far as the protection of the 
environment is concerned, a threat to it must be sufficiently 
substantiated at the time the EPO makes its decision to revoke the 
patent.59  Greenpeace, which tried to revoke Plant Genetic Systems’ 
patent on plants and seeds resistant to certain herbicides, only attracted 
evidence that there was a possibility of some undesired events 
happening because of the invention (e.g., transformation of crops into 
weeds, damage to the ecosystem).60  This evidence was not sufficient to 
substantiate the threat to the environment.61  As some have noted, “[i]t 
may well be that today a stronger case could be made out on just these 
lines.”62
Applying these principles to global warming, it could mean that the 
cost-benefit analysis test could be used only if there is evidence that a 
specific invention causes actual damage or disadvantage to the 
environment.  In that case, if the risk that the invention increases CO2 
outweighs its benefit(s) to society, then it should not be patentable 
under Article 53(a) of the EPC.  On the other hand, the rule stated in 
Plant Genetic Systems may not allow the patent office to revoke single 
inventions that each emit a small amount of CO2 because there will 
generally be a lack of evidence that a single invention can cause actual 
damage to the environment.  However, if the EPO, and more generally 
European countries and Members of the EPC wish to apply Article 27.2 
of TRIPs, they may have to be more flexible as to non-patentability in 
the case of serious damage to the environment, as seemingly this 
includes potential as well as actual damage.63  In any case, currently, as it 
is still difficult to invent alternative sources of energy that emit no CO2, 
57. Id. 
58. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 436 (citing THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 2, 
1992). 
59. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 50, at Reasons ¶ 18.5. 
60. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 50, at Reasons ¶ 18.6. 
61. Id. 
62. WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS & ALLIED RIGHTS, 21-11 (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2007). 
63. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 290. 
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it would perhaps be too harsh to impose a zero carbon emission 
standard on every invention from the start.  In addition, it is only the 
increase of CO2 beyond a certain level that contributes to global 
warming.  How patent offices should reach a decision as to the 
patentability of inventions emitting CO2 will be discussed in Part II, 
Section D. 
2.  Copyright and Related Rights 
Article 17 of the Berne Convention, although not in express terms, 
allows Members to deny copyright protection to works for public policy 
or morality reasons.64  It states that “[t]he provisions of this Convention 
cannot in any way affect the right of the Government of each country of 
the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by legislation or 
regulation, the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or 
production in regard to which the competent authority may find it 
necessary to exercise that right.”  This provision has been used by states 
to censor works in order to protect public order, public morals, or state 
security among other things, as states have interpreted this article 
broadly.65  This interpretation of Article 17 refers mainly to censorship.66  
This means that compulsory licenses cannot be introduced under it.  
There is no specific provision in the Berne Convention that denies 
copyright protection if the work damages the environment or, more 
specifically, increases levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.  It may be logical 
that such specific provisions are absent from the text of the Berne 
Convention in view of its rather old status (1886, last revised in 1979), 
but Member States can in any case use Article 17 to deny copyright 
protection to works that increase levels of CO2 if they so wish in view of 
the wide interpretation that they can give it.  The other more recent 
copyright international instruments, namely TRIPs and the 1996 World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, could have clarified 
that works increasing emissions of CO2 could not receive copyright 
protection.  Perhaps they did not because drafters were not concerned 
64. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 259 (citing SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 9.72 (Kluwer & 
QMW 1987); SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS, THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 13.88 (2d ed., Oxford 
University Press 2006); see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works art. 17, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
65. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 64, ¶ 13.88. 
66. See id., ¶ 13.90. 
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with this issue at the time (as indeed those treaties were adopted to 
address specific issues that affected copyright, mainly digitization and 
the Internet) or did not think copyright works could damage the 
environment. 
European Directives in the field of copyright do not address this 
problem.  What about UK law?  In the United Kingdom, courts have 
developed the notion that works that are “obscene, sexually immoral, 
defamatory, blasphemous, irreligious or seriously deceptive of the 
public”67 should be refused copyright protection.68  The current law is 
that courts will not only deny copyright protection if the work’s content 
is immoral, but also if the circumstances in which it was created were 
immoral.69  However, two aspects of exclusion of subject matter on the 
grounds of “public policy” are unclear.  First, it is unclear whether there 
is no copyright at all in such works or whether the copyright exists but 
will not be enforced.  As the end result is similar, this is not such an 
issue in this context.  Second, the boundaries of immorality, or rather of 
the public policy “exception,” are not clear.  Could it include works that 
could damage the environment or, more specifically, increase levels of 
CO2 in the earth’s atmosphere?  If courts apply Article 17 of the Berne 
Convention liberally or analogously to Article 27.2 of TRIPs, or even its 
Articles 7 and 8, they could very well include serious prejudice to the 
environment into the public policy exception. 
However, as Bently and Sherman note, the public policy exception 
leads to a paradox: since the works are non-copyrightable, it puts them 
in the public domain, thereby favoring their broad dissemination.70  This 
is true for works that are by definition intangible, such as literary, 
dramatic, and musical works, films, and broadcasts.  This is less true of 
some artistic works that must be replicated with certain tangible 
materials (e.g., sculptures, works of architecture, or artistic 
craftsmanship), except of course if they are reproduced by photographic 
process.  Thus for those “tangible works,” the morality provision is 
useful if interpreted to avoid copyright protection for works seriously 
damaging the environment.  As far as architectural works are 
concerned, the morality exclusion could prevent the copyrightability of 
67. CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 62 at 448. 
68. See, e.g., Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., (1915) 1 Ch. 261, 269 (a book and a film 
based on that book were denied protection, as they were advocating a “sensual adulterous 
intrigue”).  More recently, in Attorney General v. Guardian (No. 2), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 
[1990] 1 A.C. 109, the House of Lords approved the Glyn ruling. 
69. Guardian (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 1 A.C. 109. 
70. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 112. 
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architectural plans for buildings emitting CO2.  This will give an 
incentive to architects to design carbon neutral buildings.  Surely 
architects will be less enticed to draw plans for non-eco-friendly 
buildings if those architectural plans are not protected.  In addition, the 
morality or ordre public condition of patent law will provide an 
incentive to inventors of features used in buildings to innovate more 
“greenly.”  As to other tangible artistic works (e.g., engravings, 
sculptures, and works of artistic craftsmanship), similarly, the morality 
provision could possibly be used to force artists to create those works 
with materials that emit very little CO2 or were produced with little or 
no emissions.  However, this may be pushing the morality clause a bit 
far and may restrict artists’ freedom as to the choice of materials too 
much. 
A related issue is whether “intangible” copyright works should, 
under the morality or public policy provision, be required to be 
recorded on eco-friendly media.  This would arguably be pushing the 
public policy provision quite far, and it could be said that it has nothing 
to do with copyright law but that it instead relates to, e.g., 
environmental law.  If the public policy rule is not applied, in any case, it 
is clear that copyright law does not prevent recycling of the medium on 
which the copyright work is embodied.  This is explored in Section E. 
below.  But the case could be made that the morality provision in 
copyright law mandates that copyright works may have to be embodied 
in “green media.”  For literary and dramatic works and some artistic 
works (graphic and photographic), this may include recycled paper.  
One could even argue that they should be available only in electronic 
form.71  However, several reasons go against this view.  First, it may not 
always be feasible (e.g., with respect to graphic works like hand 
drawings and paintings).  Second, it may not always be convenient that 
all intangible works be in digital format only (think of newspapers and 
books).  Third, it may for policy grounds be unadvisable for three 
reasons.  The first reason is that it may unduly restrict the creative 
freedom of artists as to their choice of materials, as for tangible 
copyright works.  The second reason is that, while use of paper may 
mean the destruction of trees, digital storage also requires energy 
(electricity, which may still be generated by non-green sources).  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, having all works exclusively in digital 
71. This may make sense for software, for instance, and digital databases, although the 
object code, flow charts, and other preparatory materials of computer programs as well as 
databases can be printed and/or recorded on paper. 
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format may lock both copyright and public domain works if software or 
hardware becomes out of date or if there is a technical problem that 
does not allow access anymore.  With paper, no such problem occurs.  
Arguably paper can also be destroyed.  Possibly the most radical way to 
reduce CO2 emissions that would also accommodate the freedom to 
enjoy works in traditional media, such as paper, would be to require 
copyright holders to deposit one copy in a secure location or possibly 
two copies in two different locations (for safety purposes in case of 
flooding or fire) (in the United States, e.g., at the Library of Congress; 
in Europe, perhaps at one of the Directorate General of the European 
Commission).  Some countries’ laws, other than copyright law, already 
require this to a certain extent.  For instance, in France, Article L 131-1 
of the Patrimonial Code72 requires the deposit of all documents made 
available to the public (and therefore a fortiori copyright works) for 
collection and conservation purposes at the Bibliothèque Nationale de 
France (BnF), le Centre National de la Cinématographie, l’Institut 
National de l’Audiovisuel et le service chargé du dépôt legal du 
Ministère de l’Intérieur.73  This is subject to a fine.  Similarly, United 
States law requires deposit at the Copyright Office of all works 
published in the United States, and this is also subject to a fine.74
Finally, it may be easier to argue that the other remaining classes of 
works, such as sound recordings and films, have to be recorded on green 
formats (e.g., digital formats generated by green energy).  But as for all 
works discussed above, not only for ecological, but also for safety 
purposes, for the conservation of the public domain, and in order to not 
lock works in one single technology, at least one if not two “hard” 
copies should perhaps be deposited. 
D.  Compulsory Licenses 
1.  Patents 
Inside intellectual property laws, other general provisions, which are 
not specifically targeted at protecting the environment, can implicitly 
have a positive impact on the environment.  This is the case for 
72. Law No. 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, Journal Officiel de la Rébublique Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2006. 
73. These mean the National Library of France, The National Centre of 
Cinematography, the National Audiovisual Institute, and the service in charge with the legal 
deposit at the Home Secretary.  This requirement to deposit must respect intellectual 
property laws.  See also Law No. 2006-961, supra note 72, art. L132-3. 
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). 
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compulsory licenses expressly provided for within intellectual property 
laws.  As was shown above,75 the Paris Convention already stated that 
each Member could provide for compulsory licenses if there is abuse of 
a patent right, e.g., failure to work the invention.76  The option for 
Members to grant compulsory licenses has been restated in Article 31 of 
TRIPs, which also sets out conditions that Members must adhere to if 
they exercise this choice.77  Article 31 of TRIPs does not affect Article 
5A(2)-(4) of the Paris Convention.78
As with the TRIPs public policy provision, the downside of these 
two international provisions is that Members are not forced to adopt 
them. Therefore, each national intellectual property law must be 
checked to determine whether, if an invention (and in our specific case 
an environmentally friendly one) is not put to practice or if an invention 
improves another previously patented invention, anyone may ask for a 
license (on those conditions) and exploit it.  Let us first look at Article 
31 of TRIPs and then examine UK law. 
Article 31 of TRIPs does not oblige countries to provide for 
compulsory licenses internally (in their intellectual property laws), nor 
does it do much for the protection of the environment, in particular the 
reduction of CO2 emissions.  But if a country decides to provide for 
compulsory licenses, then it has to abide by Article 31, which lays down 
the conditions under which Members must comply if they decide to 
provide compulsory licenses in their laws.  As the conditions set forth in 
Article 31 are not exhaustive and do not refer to the environment, they 
75. Infra Part I.B. 
76. Paris Convention, supra note 26, art. 5(A)(2)-(4): 
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might 
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, 
failure to work. 
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant 
of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses.  
No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before 
the expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license. 
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or 
insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of 
filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the 
patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his 
inaction by legitimate reasons.  Such a compulsory license shall be non–exclusive 
and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub–license, except 
with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license. 
77. Id. 
78. CORREA, supra note 11, at 313. 
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give room for Members to adopt provisions that force patentees to grant 
licenses when an invention helps to prevent global warming (based on 
the authority of Article 8).79  Most relevant to the reduction of CO2 are 
paragraphs (b) and (l) of Article 31.  Paragraph (b) allows Members to 
require patentees to grant a license if they have not worked their 
invention, which is similar to Article 5A of the Paris Convention.80  The 
person who wishes to exploit the patentee’s invention must have asked 
for a license on reasonable conditions and failed to obtain it within a 
reasonable period of time.81  This requirement may be waived in case of 
national emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, and in 
cases of public non-commercial use.82  Paragraph (l) allows Members to 
provide that the holder of a first patent grants a license to the holder of 
the second patent if (i) the second invention is a dependent patent, that 
is, it “involve[s] an important technical advance of considerable 
economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first 
patent; (ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-
license on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second 
patent; and (iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be 
non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent.”83
Based on those criteria, a country could force the patentee of an eco-
friendly invention to allow its use by the state.84  For instance, if a 
country’s government could not wait twenty (or of course less) years 
before it wished to use the invention to reduce carbon emissions, Article 
31(b) could be used.  Similarly, if the patentee of a first eco-friendly 
invention refuses to grant a license to a second patentee of an 
improvement (the dependent patent) of this first invention, Article 31(l) 
could be used to force him to do so.85 The meaning of “important 
technical advance of considerable economic significance”86 will have to 
be interpreted by national legislatures87 and certainly also the courts, 
especially if national statutes do not further explain these terms. 
79. See id., at 318. 
80. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 31(b). 
81. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 318. 
82. Id. 
83. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 31. 
84. Id. 
85. There are more detailed provisions that Members must follow to respect TRIPs 
when they grant compulsory licenses.  For the details, see, e.g., CORREA, supra note 11, at 
320-23. 
86. Id. 
87. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 317-18.   
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The EPC does not contain provisions on compulsory licenses.  How 
have European countries dealt with compulsory licenses in their 
national intellectual property laws?  At the time the TRIPs agreement 
was negotiated, most countries in the world had some form of 
compulsory license in their intellectual property laws, but they were 
rarely used.88  In the United Kingdom, applications for compulsory 
licenses are rare.89  There is a simple reason for this.  In reality, few 
inventors will take the trouble to get a patent and then not work it.90  Or 
if they really find it difficult to work it, then it will be equally difficult for 
the applicant to make a clear case that he or she can solve the problems 
that the patentee could not.91  Nonetheless, the fact that compulsory 
licenses are rarely used does not mean they have no effect at all.  On the 
contrary, the simple fact that compulsory licenses exist in the law may 
give incentive to the patentee to either work the invention or voluntarily 
license it.92  However, it has been noted that in many cases, the threat of 
a compulsory license is not strong because the licensee may need know-
how from the licensor, and under the Patent Act’s above-mentioned 
rules, the licensor is not obliged to provide it to the licensee.93
UK patent law was modified following the adoption of TRIPs 
mainly to make a difference between WTO and non-WTO patent 
owners.94  As most countries in the world are now part of the WTO, few 
compulsory licenses are granted, and since UK law has to comply with 
TRIPs,95 UK law will be only briefly reviewed, and only the provisions 
88. BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 561. 
89. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 62 n. 70. 
90. See PAUL TORREMANS, HOLYOAK & TORREMANS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 100 (4th ed., Oxford University Press 2005). 
91. See id. 
92. Friedrich -Karl Beier, Exclusive rights, Statutory Licences and Compulsory Licences 
in Patent and Utility Model Law, 30 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 255, 260 (1999).  BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, 
at 561-62 (noting at n. 83 that it may also be possible to ask the European Commission to 
impose a license if the patent or copyright holder has a dominant position).  See also Intel 
Technologies v. Via Technologies [2003] F.S.R. 33 (CA); MANDEL, supra note 11, at 13 
(using the example of a provision of the U.S. Clean Air Act requiring the owner of a patent 
for an invention that is necessary to comply with air emission standards to license its patent.  
This provision of the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970 but apparently has never been used, 
therefore supporting the idea that owners of environmental patents will generally license the 
invention without the necessity of a compulsory license.).  But see TORREMANS, supra note 
90, at 101 (commenting that it is clear that compulsory licenses are not such a huge threat as it 
might first appear for patent holders).  “[T]hey are rarely sought, more rarely granted.”  Id. 
93. CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 62, at 7-48. 
94. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 562. 
95. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 48(A)(1)(b)(i). 
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applying to WTO patent owners will be addressed.  First, a compulsory 
license can be requested only after the expiration of a period of three 
years from the grant of the patent and not before.96  Second, seemingly 
the only relevant compulsory license that could be used to reduce CO2 
emissions is when a subsequent invention improves on an existing 
patent.97  Similar wording as in Article 31(l) of TRIPs is used, as the 
United Kingdom must comply with the conditions set out in Article 31 
since it chose to have such compulsory license.98
2.  Copyright and Related Rights 
The TRIPs agreement does not contain compulsory licensing 
provisions other than those already existing in the Berne Convention, 
which Article 9 of TRIPs incorporates.99  The Berne Convention 
provides the possibility for Members to grant compulsory licenses.100  
These relate to limits on the right to authorize broadcasting and related 
rights and on the right to authorize the recording of musical works and 
any works pertaining thereto.  The Rome Convention also allows 
Members to provide for compulsory licenses in limited cases that relate 
to the broadcasting or communication to the public of sound 
recordings.101  By way of example, these provisions are no longer used in 
the United Kingdom.102  There are no compulsory licenses in the EU 
Directives that would favor the reduction of CO2 in the air.  Therefore, 
currently, copyright and related rights do not permit the reduction of 
CO2 by way of compulsory licenses.  In the United Kingdom, however, 
compulsory licenses can nonetheless be imposed by the Competition 
Commission in certain cases, mainly when the copyright owner refuses 
to grant a license on reasonable terms and when the license restricts the 
use of the work by the licensee or the right of the owner to grant other 
licenses.103  These powers are exercisable in consequence of a report of 
the Competition Commission.  So again, as with the morality provision, 
not surprisingly, these provisions do not specifically relate to the 
safeguard of the environment let alone the reduction of CO2.  But they 
96. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 562. 
97. U.K. Patent Act §48(A)(l)(b)(i) (1977); TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 31. 
98. See, e.g., CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 62, at 299. 
99. TRIPs, supra note 23, art. 19. 
100. Berne Convention, supra note 64, art. 11bis (2) and art. 13. 
101. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 44. 
102. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 259-60. 
103. See also TORREMANS, supra note 90, at 285. 
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could nevertheless be used to this effect if the work or use of the work 
reduces levels of CO2.  It is difficult to conceive of such a case, but the 
following examples might not be so far from reality: a copyrightable 
object (such as “green” hardware), a protectable work such as software, 
whose aim is to reduce CO2, or a database containing information on 
how to reduce levels of CO2. 
Whether the use of compulsory licenses is the best way to encourage 
inventions that reduce carbon emissions will be discussed in Part II, 
Section B. 
E.  The Principle of Exhaustion 
Do IPRs prevent the recycling of products so that more carbon 
emissions are produced by forcing consumers to buy more products 
whose production has emitted CO2?  If we accept that recycling 
products protected by a patent or copyright involves a re-use or transfer 
of the original IPR-protected product as is or a complete destruction of 
it—in other words, it does not involve a change (a change would fall 
under making or repair rather than recycle)—then IPRs do not block 
the recycling of products because the principle of exhaustion (or first-
sale doctrine as it is called in the United States) applies.  Indeed the 
transfer or re-use of IPR-protected products does not involve any of the 
exclusive rights in copyright and patent (nor for that matter design and 
trademark) laws.  As a reminder, this principle, which applies to all 
IPRs, provides that the right of distribution of the IPR holder is 
exhausted once he or she first puts his or her product on the market or it 
is put on the market with his or her consent.104
IPR holders may be tempted to override the principle of exhaustion 
by way of contracts or technological protection measures (TPMs), but 
this is arguably against articles 28-30 of the EC Treaty on the free 
movement of goods and the corresponding case law, and in some 
countries (France and Belgium) inalienability clauses have been held 
void because they are against the very definition of property and the 
Civil Code, which favors the free circulation of goods.105  Thus contracts 
104. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-16 (EC); Law No. 93-1420 of Dec. 
31, 1993, Official Journal of the European Communities, Jan. 1, 1994, at 18;  The UK Patent 
Act does not provide for the principle, but Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper 
v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, establishes the principle of exhaustion in the 
European Union.  See also Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 7 (EEC); Council 
Directive 98/71, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28-35 (EC). 
105. See SEVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES 
DANS L’UNIVERS NUMERIQUE, DROITS ET EXCEPTIONS A LA LUMIERE DES DISPOSITIFS DE 
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and TPMs that prevent recycling of copyright or patented products 
should be void.106  Even if they were not, they may be in conflict with 
some EU environmental laws that require recycling at least in certain 
technological sectors (e.g., vehicles, packaging, and electronic 
equipment).  These issues are beyond the scope of this Article, as they 
concern contracts and TPMs and not IPRs as such and are discussed in 
other sources, to which the reader is referred.107
F.  Conclusion 
The first part of this Article has shown that part of the current 
intellectual property laws already directly or indirectly favors inventions 
and creations that reduce the level of CO2 in the planet’s atmosphere.  
Thanks to the provisions on ordre public and on compulsory licenses 
that exist in European patent and copyright laws, such IPRs should 
normally only be granted to inventions and creations that do not 
increase carbon emissions.  In addition, IPR holders may not prevent 
recycling.  Because provisions are broad, legislatures and courts can, if 
they so wish, interpret them to reduce or even eliminate carbon 
emissions.  However, it may be possible to make intellectual property 
laws even greener if that is how governments wish to tackle global 
warming.108  This may be one of the ways to do so, as many 
industrialized countries (around 140 of them) already committed in the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to cut greenhouse gases emissions by 5.2 percent 
compared to 1990 levels by 2012.109  The Protocol came into force in 
February 2005,110 and as we know, many products and sources of energy 
VERROUILLAGE DES OEUVRES § 517 (Larcier 2005), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=w3TQHuFZW94C&printsec=frontcover (citing Jacques Hansenne, Les biens – 
Précis, Collection Scientifique de la Faculté de Droit de Liège:  Liège, p. 584, n. 631). 
106. See Estelle Derclaye, Blocking Repair and Recycle Through End User License 
Agreements and Technological Protection Measures, 7TH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SEMINAR 
ORGANIZED BY THE MACAO INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN STUDIES (IEEM):  “INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: REPAIRS, INTERCONNECTIONS AND CONSUMER WELFARE,” Macao, June 
26-27, 2006 (forthcoming, Kluwer Law International, 2008), Section A.II. 
107. Id. at Section C.I. 
108. Note that in the United States, 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(C) (2005) already allows patent 
applicants to ask that the patent examination be accelerated if the invention “will materially 
enhance the quality of the environment or materially contribute to the development or 
conservation of energy resources.”  MANDEL, supra note 11, at 15-16 (explaining that since 
regulations for accelerating environment patents are rarely used, it does not increase the 
incentive to innovate greenly). 
109. STUART BELL & DONALD MCGILLIVRAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 639 (6th ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
110. Id. at 640. 
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that emit CO2 are the result of inventions and creations for which 
private companies, governments, and even individuals—the little or not 
yet known authors and inventors—desperately seek copyright or patent 
protection. 
II.  HOW TO MAKE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS GREENER 
The current intellectual property laws could be improved by 
modifying the morality and public order provisions and the compulsory 
licensing rules.  Yet another way, as IPRs are human rights, is to balance 
IPRs with other human rights that may directly or indirectly protect the 
environment.  Why should it be so?  First, because the aim of 
intellectual property laws is human well-being, and individual well-being 
depends on that of our common planet.  Therefore, in view of this 
ultimate international goal and the trans-national effect of global 
warming, all countries’ intellectual property laws should be modified to 
allow the reduction of CO2.  Second, there is an increasing trend that 
says that human rights must be respected in all ways possible, including 
by way of intellectual property laws. 
A.  Modifying the Morality and Ordre Public Provisions 
This Section does not need long developments.  As argued in Part I, 
Section C, courts can already use the morality and ordre public 
provisions in patent and copyright laws to regulate protection of non-
eco-friendly products.  Nonetheless, more could be done at the 
international level and if not, at the regional or national levels, by 
modifying the relevant legal instruments.  First and foremost, 
international conventions could be changed to force Members to 
prohibit inventions and creations that generate over a certain amount of 
CO2 in the atmosphere; at the moment, Members are free to choose to 
do so or not.  This would increase legal certainty, harmonization, and 
effectiveness since this issue is currently left to the courts of states that 
have adopted such rules, with the correlative disadvantages (mainly 
divergent decisions).  For patents, a more stringent rule than that stated 
in Plant Genetic Systems may be necessary in the future so that patent 
offices can revoke single inventions that emit above a certain threshold 
of CO2 even though there is no concrete evidence that a particular 
invention causes actual damage to the environment.  As to copyright, as 
noted above, a “zero” carbon emission rule can work but may not in all 
cases be advisable.  On the one hand, for tangible works, it may restrict 
artists’ freedom as to the choice of materials too much, and for 
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intangible works, it may lock works into digital format and may not 
always be convenient. 
B.  Modifying the Compulsory Licensing Rules 
1.  Patents 
It is clear, as has been shown above, that generally, compulsory 
licenses could help improve the environment.111  Of course, more detail 
as to how they could improve the reduction of CO2 is needed.  As to 
patents, one can take two views.  One view is to maintain the status 
quo—in other words, to not change the TRIPs compulsory licensing 
rules in the sense that countries remain free not to impose any of these 
rules in their intellectual property laws.  Another view is to change the 
rules—ideally at the international level so that all TRIPs Members have 
to comply; otherwise at the national level so that one or more countries 
set the example—and force countries to provide for compulsory licenses 
when an inventor or creator comes up with a product emitting very little 
or no CO2. 
Within this latter view, two scenarios can be distinguished.  First, in 
the event that a second inventor improves on the already green 
invention, at least in the United Kingdom, a compulsory licensing 
scheme already exists and should be maintained.  It may nevertheless be 
argued that the general rule—that three years must lapse before the 
second inventor may ask that the license be scrapped—better protects 
the environment.  In this scenario, since a cross-license has to be given 
to the first patentee, it should not reduce the incentives of the first 
patentee too much.  But this is a tough choice to make.  Perhaps the 
current compulsory licensing provisions in the United Kingdom are 
already providing the necessary and correct incentives.  Scrapping or 
reducing the length of three years may be counter-productive, as first 
inventors may be deterred from inventing greener products and 
processes in the first place, knowing they will only be able to reap the 
full benefits of their inventions for three years.  Indeed, some believe 
that compulsory licenses in general would deter environmental 
innovation.112  Others argue that compulsory licenses have a positive 
impact because they allow follow-on innovations.113  At least one study 
examining some companies shows that compulsory licenses do not 
111. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 319. 
112. See MANDEL, supra note 11, at 12. 
113. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 313. 
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diminish incentives of patentees.114  Further economic studies may have 
to be undertaken to show whether this is indeed generally the case.115  
Certainly in the scenario where it is a simple copier who asks for the 
license, the rule should arguably not apply as this would considerably 
reduce the incentive to invent the green product in the first place.  
Consequently, products emitting little or no CO2 would not be invented 
in the first place. 
Second, as far as inventions that are not put to practice are 
concerned, probably the Paris Convention or TRIPs should be modified 
to force countries to adopt this rule; otherwise, states could of course 
separately take the initiative.  Indeed, even if it is rare that inventions 
are not put to practice, the case could happen where the state, or a 
company with a vested interest, buys an eco-friendly invention from the 
inventor simply in order to stop its exploitation.  If the specific country 
has not taken the option left in the Paris Convention to force the owner 
to work the invention, only competition law can be used; this requires a 
dominant position and the other disadvantages described in the next 
paragraphs. 
The other view, as stated above, is to maintain the status quo.  This 
may be the way to go, as competition laws may already provide a means 
to prevent abuses of dominant positions by IPR holders anyway.116
What is the best approach?  Neither of these two views as proposed 
is in itself satisfactory.  Forcing countries to adopt compulsory licensing 
rules for every IPR without distinction, such as those provided for in 
TRIPs and the more detailed ones existing in the United Kingdom, may 
in fact be counter-productive.  This is because the rules apply despite 
the establishment of a dominant position by the IPR holder.  Now, if 
there is competition in the market, the market will function properly, 
and no legal remedies should be imposed on inventors and creators if 
they do not possess a dominant position.  However, in the author’s view, 
it is better for legal certainty, to reduce costs,117 and because the case law 
114. Id. at 314 (citing FREDERICK SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICY AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 107-08 (Robert 
Anderson & Nancy Gallini eds., University of Calgary Press 1998)). 
115. See CORREA, supra note 11, at 314 n.169. 
116. See EC Treaty art. 82; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  See, e.g., European Community and 
U.S. case law. 
117. If there is an abuse, either it will trigger litigation, which will involve costs, 
including for the state (since it is the competition authorities’ task to detect and sue potential 
abusers) and at the end of the day the taxpayers, or if litigation is not engaged, the cost will 
rest with the users, who will be charged an excessive price or be denied access to information.  
In addition, competition authorities may become flooded with litigation, and delays may 
 2008] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL WARMING 289 
 
 
is not yet very clear (at least in Europe),118 that the statutory law 
provides fairly detailed rules rather than leave this to the competition 
authorities.119  The best compromise or solution would therefore be to 
include this requirement of dominant position inside the patent laws’ 
compulsory licensing provisions. 
2.  Copyright and Related Rights 
Introducing compulsory licenses into copyright law has 
disadvantages, like with patent law.120  First, it requires putting in place 
an administrative procedure, and this is costly and time-consuming.  
Second, the price of a license can be correctly evaluated only by 
negotiations in the market place.  In that connection (between the price 
of a compulsory license and the market place), a compulsory license 
obviously takes away the exclusive right of the IPR holder, which allows 
him or her to negotiate the price.121  This is why, like for patents above, 
it makes sense to introduce compulsory licenses into copyright law only 
when the copyright or related right holder has a dominant position.  
Indeed, in this case the market cannot work efficiently, as users face a 
single source of power.  Article 144 of the UK Copyright Act already 
provides for some sort of internal compulsory license,122 but there needs 
to be a report by the Competition Commission for it to apply.  What 
occur with handling cases. 
118. It took almost ten years to have a case before the European Court of Justice 
(E.C.J.) to clarify the relationship between intellectual property and Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty.  The only three intellectual property cases preceding the current latest ruling on the 
issue (Microsoft v. Commission, T-201/04, 2007 O.J. (L 179)) are IMS Health GmbH & Co. 
OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, C-418/01, 2004 E.C.D.R. 239; Radio Telefis Eireann 
(RTE) & Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission C-241/91P & C-242/91, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743; and Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission of the European Communities, T-
504/93, 1997 E.C.R. II-923; [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 309.  The latter two decisions gave confusing 
messages about the conditions under which a refusal to license information is abusive, while 
the IMS decision cleared the matter.  Unfortunately, it is arguable that the Microsoft decision 
has reopened Pandora’s box. 
119. See also FRANÇOIS LÉVÊQUE & YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS 
AND COPYRIGHT (Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=642622 (last visited March 18, 2008). 
120. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 50, at 259. 
121. Id. 
122. UK law also provides for a compulsory licensing system for sui generis right-
protected databases close to that provided in Section 144 of the Copyright Act.  See Schedule 
2 of the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032, HIS – Issue 302, 
p. 10145 (effective Jan. 1, 1998).  The European sui generis right protects the substantial 
investment that went in the collection, presentation, and/or verification of the data rather 
than the originality of the database’s structure/organization (which copyright law already 
protects).  See Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20, 20-28 (EC). 
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there would need to be is a compulsory license scheme that applies to 
protected subject matter owned by the copyright or related right holder 
in a dominant position, similar to those that already exist under patent 
law compulsory licenses.  In both cases, action could be taken by anyone 
(be it users, the general public, or the competition authorities 
themselves).  However, in the case of copyright works, such compulsory 
licenses should arguably respect the freedom to create explained in Part 
I, Section C.2. 
Copyright laws at all levels would also need to ensure that official 
documents containing original expression relating to the reduction of 
CO2 are not protected by copyright.
123  Indeed, as such copyright 
protected subject-matter is made by the state (parliament, government, 
or judiciary), no copyright should subsist because users of the materials 
have already paid for it through their taxes.  The morality provision 
could also apply to this situation, but it is less legally certain than the 
solution advocated here. This proposed change could apply to 
judgments and laws in the United Kingdom for instance—at least those 
that contain such original expression relating to the reduction of CO2 in 
the atmosphere—that are still protected by copyright.  Similarly, 
publicly funded databases should remain unprotected by the European 
database sui generis right.124  The data should be available to anyone for 
free or at the cost of sending it (which may be zero if available and sent 
electronically).  Admittedly, such provisions would not be compulsory 
licenses but simply an exclusion from copyrightable subject matter or 
subject matter protected by related rights. 
C.  Resorting to Human Rights 
One way to reduce levels of CO2 is to argue that IPRs must respect 
other human rights that relate to the protection of the environment.  
IPRs are arguably human rights, either as such or within the right to the 
respect of one’s property.  Many of the main international binding and 
non-binding instruments recognize the moral and material interests of 
authors and inventors as human rights.125  In Europe, IPRs are human 
123. See Art. 2(4) Berne Convention. 
124. Initially, the draft Database Directive provided for a compulsory license for sole 
source databases, but it was scrapped as a result of lobbying.  See art. 8.1, COM (1992) 24 
final. 
125. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A 71, 76 183d plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights art. 15, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) 49, 51 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(Dec. 16, 1966); Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, Dec. 18, 2000 
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rights falling into Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to the 
respect of one’s property.126  IPRs have also been recognized as human 
rights in the literature.127  On the other hand, the ECHR does not 
contain a right to a clean and/or healthy environment.128  Nor does 
international law yet recognize such a right.129  Therefore, at present, 
there is no such international enforceable right.130  Thornton & 
Beckwith note that courts and commentators have been reluctant to 
recognize a human right to a clean and/or healthy environment for three 
main reasons.131  First, as human rights protect individuals, in order for 
the right to be violated, there must be a direct and substantial impact on 
a particular individual.  Second, human rights and the protection of the 
O.J. (C 364) 1, 12 (stating that intellectual property is protected).  However, the first two 
instruments leave states the choice of the form in which to recognize these human rights.  
Property rights are not the only form. 
126. Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol provides that “every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest [. . .].”  Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, No. 
73049/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), has recently confirmed this. 
127. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 15; ALAI Congress on Copyright and Freedom of 
Speech, Barcelona 2006, available at http://www.aladda.org/eventos.php?id=aladda&evento 
=0606  (last visited Aug. 28, 2007); CIER Utrecht, Conference on Intellectual Property Rights 
and Human Rights, July 3-4, 2006. 
128. STUART BELL & DONALD MCGILLIVRAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 79 (6th ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Ann Sherlock & Françoise Jarvis, The European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Environment, EUR. L. REV. 15 (1999).  “Damage to the 
environment is not in itself a breach of the convention.”  Id.  See also Lough v. First Sec’y of 
State [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2557, 2569 (CA (Civ Div)) (observing that “[t]here is no explicit right 
in the Convention to a clean and quiet environment”). 
129. See, e.g., JUSTINE THORNTON & SILAS BECKWITH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 386 
(2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2004) (noting the three main international human rights 
instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, barely mentioning the relationship between the environment and human rights); 
Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 126, at 28 (stating that the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 refers to “the improvement of all aspects of 
environmental and industrial hygiene”); Karrie A. Wolfe, Greening the International Human 
Rights Sphere?  An Examination of Environmental Rights and the Draft Declaration of 
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 109 (2003); Barry 
E. Hill, Steve Wolfson, & Nicholas Targ, Human Rights and the Environment:  A Synopsis 
and Some Predictions, 16 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 376 (2004).  In 1994, the United 
Nations issued a Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.  
Then followed the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, which shows a trend 
favoring a human right to a clean and healthy environment.  See Hill, Wolfson & Targ, at 376-
77. 
130. Id. at 361, 399. 
131. THORNTON & BECKWITH, supra note 129, at 386. 
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environment may sometimes clash.  For instance, the right of 
Amazonian Indians not to be hungry and therefore to cut trees to create 
farmland goes against long-term reduction of CO2.  Third, human rights 
only protect the current generation.  They cannot be used to promote 
sustainable development, i.e., the preservation of the environment for 
future generations.132  These reasons may very well undermine the use of 
human rights to reduce CO2 emissions.  Thornton and Beckwith also 
note that it currently looks unlikely that such a right to a decent 
environment will ever be developed at an international level because of 
this third reason.133  The international community seems instead to have 
shifted to the notion of sustainable development.134
Nonetheless, in Europe, several human rights have been used by 
parties to try to benefit from a healthy environment.  Therefore, there 
may be some potential to use current human rights to reduce CO2 
emissions.  A helpful rule is that under the ECHR, all human rights are 
on equal footing, so IPRs must be balanced with other human rights.135  
How have claimants argued that the environment was damaged on the 
basis of other human rights? Claimants have used Article 2 (right to 
life), Article 3 (right to physical integrity), Article 8 (right to privacy), 
Article 10 (right to freedom of expression), and Article 1 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the ECHR (right to the respect of one’s 
property) with mixed results.  What comes out of the case law is the 
following. 
The possibility to claim that there is a right, albeit indirect, to a clean 
and/or healthy environment under the current state of the ECHR is slim 
but not unreal.  The major hurdle is that an individual must be 
specifically affected.136  This means that an environmental pressure 
group would have to introduce an action based on the right of a 
particular individual, “focusing on the individual’s rights rather than on 
the more general concerns for the environment.”137  Under Article 8, for 
132. Sustainable development is a new and still uncertain concept.  The most used 
definition, which originates from the report by the Bruntland Commission, Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, delivered to the General Assembly, 
A/42/187, 154  (Dec. 11, 1987), is development that “[m]eets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”  BELL & 
MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 109, at 62. 
133. THORNTON & BECKWITH, supra note 129, at 388. 
134. Id. at 388.  Contra Hill, Wolfson & Targ, supra note 99, at 376. 
135. Torremans, supra note 17, at 17. 
136. See, e.g., Jarvis & Sherlock , supra note 126, at 15; THORNTON & BECKWITH, 
supra note 129, at 386. 
137. Sherlock & Jarvis, supra note 128, at 15. 
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instance, there must be a substantial, direct, and serious interference 
with an individual’s home.138  On the other hand, as early as 1991, in 
Fredin v. Sweden,139 the European Court of Human Rights recognized 
“that environmental protection is a valid public interest that can be 
employed by states in interfering with individual rights.”140  Most 
importantly, states party to the ECHR have positive duties.  In Guerra 
v. Italy,141 Judge Jambrek thought that “if information was withheld by a 
government about circumstances that foreseeably presented a real risk 
of danger to health and physical integrity, then such a situation might be 
protected by Article 2.”142  In the same vein, under Article 8’s case 
law,143 the state has the positive duty to take action even if the pollution 
is caused by a third party and not the state, for instance private 
companies.144  Finally, Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the 
ECHR can be “invoked against a State when external environmental 
nuisances affect a person’s enjoyment of possessions, or it can be 
invoked from the opposite direction: when a State’s actions to protect 
the environment interfere with enjoyment of property.”145  The Fredin 
case also shows that Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol does not 
prevent states from taking measures to protect the environment, 
although they limit the right to the respect of one’s property.146
The consequences of these precedents seem to imply that, at least in 
Europe, human rights indirectly protecting the environment, including 
the reduction of carbon emissions, can limit IPRs.  In other words, if all 
the branches of the state (in our case this would include intellectual 
property offices) know that an invention or creation may have negative 
138. Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (2003) 
(noise caused by night flights disturbed claimants’ sleep in neighborhoods near Heathrow 
airport).  See K.L. Morrow, The Rights Question:  The Initial Impact of the Human Rights Act 
on Domestic Law Relating to the Environment, J. PLAN. & ENVT. L. 1010, 1012 (2005). 
139. Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 12033/86, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Mr. 
Fredin’s right to exploit a gravel pit on his property was not breached by a change in the law 
which withdrew his exploitation permit in order to protect the environment.). 
140. Morrow, supra note 138, at 1020. 
141. Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998) (Guerra lived 
one kilometer away from a chemical factory and was not informed of its risks on his health.). 
142. Sherlock & Jarvis, supra note 128 at 17. 
143. See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, no. 303-C) 
277 (1994); Powell and Rayner v. UK, App. No. 9310/81, 172 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A, no. 172) 
355 (1990); Guerra, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357; Hatton, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28. 
144. Sherlock & JarviS, supra note 128, at 19; THORNTON & BECKWITH, supra note 
126, at 392. 
145. Sherlock & Jarvis, supra note 128, at 22. 
146. Id. at 23. 
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effects on the environment, e.g., increasing levels of CO2, the 
responsibility lies with the state to prevent harm to life, privacy, 
property, and arguably freedom of expression.147  This may mean that, 
while the state should ideally modify intellectual property laws to attain 
such results, in the meantime, individuals can try and use several 
different human rights before courts to force the state to take action to 
eliminate or at least reduce carbon emissions.148  Nonetheless, as has 
been seen above, the two major hurdles are that the ECHR does not 
recognize a specific right to a healthy environment, and that even if it 
did, in order to have a claim an individual must be directly concerned.  
In addition, the case law reveals that states have a wide margin of 
appreciation as, generally, human rights are limited by rights of others 
(e.g., Article 8(2)).149  So it may be very difficult for an individual to 
claim that an invention or work by itself affects his or her personal 
environment because it emits CO2.  These discrepancies may prompt the 
international community and/or states to develop a specific human right 
(nationally, regionally, and internationally) to a clean and healthy 
environment;150 the notion includes the right not to live in a greenhouse, 
or alternatively to produce similar effects by further developing the 
notion of sustainable development, as it may be more appropriate.151
147. In Guerra, it was held, however, that the state has no positive duty to collect and 
disseminate information. 
148. According to Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 128, at 24 (in view of the decided 
cases, ECHR art. 8 seems to be the best legal ground for claimants to win if they think their 
environment is degraded). 
149. See, e.g., Buckley v. UK, App. No. 20348/92, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101 (1996); 
Hatton, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (holding that Article 8 was not breached). 
150. Morrow, supra note 138, at 1021. 
151. Internationally the concept, on whose meaning there is no international 
consensus, is still found only in soft law documents.  But it has been recognized by the 
International Court of Justice as being the need to balance economic development and 
environmental protection.  See BELL & MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 109, at 63-64.  In Europe, 
EC Treaty art. 2 includes the obligation for the EU to promote a “harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities.”  It applies across all areas.  This article has 
not been interpreted by the E.C.J. yet, but there are two documents so far at EC level that set 
priorities, including climate change, but they and their objectives are not legally binding.  Id.  
Note that Articles 6 and 174(1) EC Treaty favor integrating environmental protection into 
other policy sectors rather than favoring a rights-based approach.  Id. at 79.  Finally, in the 
United Kingdom, several acts require a contribution to the achievement of sustainable 
development.  However, as the notion is not defined and the wording of the relevant sections 
is “too wide to create a legally enforceable duty,” much is still to be done in the United 
Kingdom.  Id. at 66. 
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D.  Implementation Practicalities 
Two problems may arise from the proposed changes to the 
intellectual property laws.  First, what should be the maximum amount 
of CO2 that an invention or creation should emit?  Arguably, every 
living thing and activity inevitably produces some CO2.  It is only its 
excessive increase by man which produces global warming.  One 
yardstick could be the Kyoto targets, or the national targets if higher.  
For instance, if the target is to decrease the levels of CO2 by a certain 
percentage less than the levels at a certain previous date, this should be 
the standard for the Patent Offices to follow.  Second, and related to 
this point, who should bear the burden of proof that the invention does 
not emit more than the yardstick?  If this burden is borne by inventors 
and creators, it might discourage them from innovating or creating in 
the first place.  If it is borne by the state, every taxpayer will contribute 
to the cost.  Perhaps this solution may be more acceptable.  Otherwise, a 
shared cost between the creators or inventors and society can also be 
envisaged. 
CONCLUSION 
Current intellectual property laws already provide a good working 
framework to reduce levels of CO2 in the planet’s atmosphere.  If a 
particular state has chosen to implement the ordre public and 
compulsory licensing provisions found in international treaties, courts if 
they wish can already use these provisions to prevent the protection of 
inventions and works emitting (too much) CO2.  The principle of 
exhaustion already preserves the recycling of media in which IPRs are 
embodied.  Human rights laws may also perhaps contribute to the 
reduction of CO2.  But international, regional, and national intellectual 
property laws could be honed further if governments wish to decrease 
levels of CO2 even more.  A specific public policy and morality provision 
prohibiting patenting inventions and copyrighting works generating 
above a certain level of CO2 should be enacted, preferably 
internationally.  Similarly, states should be forced to enact compulsory 
licenses, but the latter should only be used when the patent or copyright 
owners have a dominant position.  It would be better to set this clearly 
in legislative instruments rather than leaving it to competition 
authorities.  Public databases and copyright works (e.g., those made by 
the state) should remain unprotected. 
In the meantime, competition law can of course be used as an 
external safeguard to prevent abuses of IPRs such as refusals to work an 
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environmentally friendly invention.  Competition rules (at least in the 
EU) can also promote innovation of greener technologies (e.g., the 
reduction of CO2) even though they are the result of agreements or 
concerted practices (e.g., cartels) between undertakings that are 
normally prohibited by competition law.152  Finally, in any case, 
inventions and copyright works may also have to comply with 
international, national, and regional environmental rules.  This second 
external safeguard is already somewhat effective, at least in Europe.153  
Several Directives already prescribe energy efficiency or energy labeling 
for refrigerators, freezers, and boilers.154  As far as IPRs are concerned, 
this would mean that if such appliances are patented, they must respect 
the prescriptions of these Directives.  Another very recent binding 
measure is the emissions trading scheme (ETS) provided by Directive 
2003/87.155  This Directive obliges a number of industries (including oil 
152. Article 81(3) EC Treaty derogates to the general prohibition of Article 81(1) and 
allows agreements between undertakings if they promote progress.  It reads: 
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:  
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, any decision or 
category of decisions by associations of undertakings, any concerted practice or 
category of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  (a) impose on 
the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
EU competition law also regulates anti-competitive aspects of intellectual property licenses, 
which includes know-how.  See Commission Regulation 772/2004, on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, O.J. (L 123) 11 
(EC). 
153. Mandel notes that U.S. environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act, have not succeeded much in promoting environmental innovation.  
MANDEL, supra note 11, at 2.  In Europe there are regulatory bodies in the EC and the UK 
which determine whether some practices should be prohibited, among other reasons, to 
ensure the protection of the environment.  CORNISH & LLEWLELYN, supra note 60, 5-83. 
154. STRECK & FREESTONE, supra note 10, at 101.  See Council Directive 96/57, 
Energy Efficiency Requirements for Household Electric Refrigerators, Freezers and 
Combinations Thereof, 1996 O.J. (L 236) 36 (EC); Commission Directive 95/12, 
Implementing Council Directive 92/75/EC With Regard to Energy Labelling of Household 
Washing Machines, 1995 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC); Commission Directive 96/60 Implementing 
Council Directive 92/75 With Regard to Energy Labelling of Household Combined Washer-
Driers, 1996 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC). 
155. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC).  See also THORNTON & 
BECKWITH, supra note 126, at 70.  It was amended by Directive 2004/101 amending Directive 
2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 1, so that 
the EU ETS takes into account the Kyoto Protocol’s targets.  For details, see STRECK & 
FREESTONE, supra note 10, at 104; Davies, supra note 12. 
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refineries, coke ovens, the metal industry, the mineral industry, and the 
broad paper industry) to have a permit that states the amount of 
greenhouse gases they can emit.  Again, this means that copyright works 
or patented inventions made by these processes have to respect this 
Directive.  The EU will surely adopt more similar environmental 
measures in the future.  In this connection, conflicts with artists’ 
creativity as to choice of materials may already be an issue, and a 
balance may have to be struck between copyright law and 
environmental law.  Building greener patented inventions may on the 
other hand be more feasible, as choice of materials is generally not 
dictated by considerations of aesthetics (unless a patented product is 
also protected by a design right or a copyright).  A full discussion of the 
relationship between IPRs and environmental law is worth exploring 
but is beyond the scope of this Article. 
In conclusion, while progress (the goal of intellectual property laws) 
normally aims to improve human life, as the industrial revolution has 
shown, this has not been without hick-ups, the main hick-up being 
pollution and, more specifically, global warming.  But as history has a 
thousand times shown, humans are capable of the worst and the best.  
To save themselves, there is hope that thanks to the existing 
mechanisms already in place in intellectual property laws and the above-
mentioned remedies to their imperfections, carbon emissions will 
decrease in the not too distant future.  In addition, intellectual property 
laws, human rights, competition law, and environmental rules can 
certainly work hand in hand to fight global warming. 
 
